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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 04-3267
BERTHINA C. McDANIELS,
                 Appellant
   v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
District Court No. 03-cv-00190
District Court Judge: The Honorable Dennis M. Cavanaugh
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 26, 2005
Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, ALITO and GARTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: June 10, 2005)
OPINION OF THE COURT
PER CURIAM:
Because we write for the parties only, we will not recite the facts of this case. 
Berthina McDaniels appeals a final order of the District Court affirming a decision of the
2Commissioner of Social Security denying her application for Disability Insurance
Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”).  For the reasons that follow,
we affirm.
I.
When review is denied by the Appeals Council, this Court reviews the decision of
the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) as the final decision of the Commissioner.  See
Matthews v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 589, 592 (3d Cir. 2001).  The Commissioner’s application of
the law receives plenary review.  See Monsour Med. Ctr. v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1191
(3d Cir. 1986).  Findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence.  See 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g) (2000) (“The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if
supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .”); Hartranft v. Apfel, 181
F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999).
Under the substantial evidence standard, the Commissioner’s decision must be
upheld if it is supported on the record as a whole by “such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”  Monsour Med. Ctr.,
806 F.2d at 1190 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The evidence “must be enough to
justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict.”  Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
II.
To be eligible for DIB and SSI, a claimant must establish that she is unable “to
3engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has
lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.”  42
U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (2000); see also id. § 1382c(a)(3)(A).  Applications for benefits are
evaluated under the five-step process of 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 and 416.920.  The
evaluation considers (1) whether the claimant is working, (2) whether she has a severe
impairment, (3) whether her severe impairment meets or medically equals a listed
impairment, (4) whether she has the residual functional capacity to return to past relevant
work, and (5) whether she can make an adjustment to other available work.  See Ramirez
v. Barnhart, 372 F.3d 546, 550-51 (3d Cir. 2004); Matthews, 239 F.3d at 589 n.1.
McDaniels challenges the Commissioner’s decision at the third and fourth steps of
the inquiry.  She first argues that the ALJ offered no evidence for his finding that her
impairments failed to meet or equal a listed impairment.  She then argues that the ALJ’s
decision failed to consider probative medical evidence.  Finally, she argues that the ALJ
misapplied the Commissioner’s regulations in evaluating her subjective complaints of
pain.  We discuss these arguments in turn.
A.
McDaniels characterizes the ALJ’s third step determination as “almost a word-for-
word copy of the exact analysis rejected” in Burnett v. Commissioner of Social Security
Administration, 220 F.3d 112 (3d Cir. 2000).  McDaniels’s Br. at 9.  Although the
4wording of the two decisions is similar, this Court in Jones v. Barnhart made clear that the
“particular language” or “format” of the Commissioner’s decision should not be given
talismanic significance.  364 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 2004).  The relevant inquiry is
whether “there is sufficient development of the record and explanation of findings to
permit meaningful review.”  Id.  The ALJ’s analysis in Jones, though even terser than the
analysis in Burnett, passed muster because “the ALJ’s decision, read as a whole,
illustrates that the ALJ considered the appropriate factors in reaching the conclusion”
under review.  Id.
Under the rule of Burnett as explained in Jones, the ALJ’s decision at the third step
is supported by substantial evidence.  The ALJ focused on the listings pertinent to the
musculoskeletal system, and we agree with the Commissioner that the only relevant
listing is section 1.04.  The listed impairment requires evidence of sensory or reflex loss,
spinal arachnoiditis, or an inability to ambulate effectively.  See 20 C.F.R. ch. III, pt. 404,
subpt. P, app. 1, § 1.04(A)-(C).  McDaniels reported only numbness in her left hand, not
sensory or reflex loss.  See Record at 117.  She was never diagnosed with spinal
arachnoiditis.  With the exception of her fractured ankle, which was not expected to
impair her for more than twelve months, she could ambulate effectively.  See id. (“Her
gait was normal.”).  Substantial evidence thus supports the ALJ’s finding that
McDaniels’s impairments did not meet or medically equal a listed impairment.
 In fact, McDaniels herself contradicted the report when she averred that she1
“can’t lift anything” and “can’t bend.”  Record at 67.  As we explain below, substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that McDaniels had overstated her impairments.
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B.
McDaniels argues that the ALJ’s assessment of her residual functional capacity
ignored probative evidence and was without foundation, but she can point to little
evidence that the ALJ actually overlooked or improperly considered.  Contrary to her
claim that the ALJ “concede[d] only that appellant has cervical disc disease and a lumbar
strain,” McDaniels’s Br. at 12, the ALJ found that “[t]he objective evidence from 1997
revealed a herniated disc at C5-6.”  Record at 14.  His finding that she could occasionally
lift fifty pounds and frequently lift twenty-five pounds finds support in the report of Dr.
Miranda.  The ALJ gave Dr. Miranda’s report “great weight” because it was
“uncontradicted” and “fully consistent with the evidence of record.”   Record at 15. 1
According to McDaniels, her past relevant work as a security guard did not require lifting
anywhere near fifty pounds and frequently required lifting less than ten pounds.  See
Record at 68.  The ALJ’s finding that her back and neck pain would not prevent her from
performing this work is supported by substantial evidence.
McDaniels appears to misunderstand the ALJ’s finding with respect to her
trimalleolar fracture.  Contrary to the imputation of her brief, the ALJ never found that
the fracture was insufficiently severe to “impede some aspect of the ability to perform one
of the basic work-related functions.”  McDaniels’s Br. at 16.  Rather, he found that the
6fracture would not disable her for more than twelve months.  See Record at 16 (finding
that the fracture was “not documented as a severe impairment expected to meet the
durational requirement” (emphasis added)).
This finding is supported by substantial evidence.  Dr. Rossini reported that her
fracture was responding well to treatment and would disable her for less than a year.  See
Record at 171.  The ALJ left the record open so that McDaniels could submit further
evidence, but none was forthcoming.  In light of Dr. Rossini’s unrebutted report and the
remaining evidence of record, a reasonable fact finder could easily find that McDaniels’s
fracture would not limit her for more than twelve months.
C.
McDaniels’s argument that the ALJ did not properly consider her subjective
complaints of pain is meritless.  Far from ignoring her testimony, the ALJ clearly found
that McDaniels “experiences some pain.”  Record at 15.  The ALJ also found, however,
that the remaining evidence of record was “inconsistent with an individual with the
degree of neck and back pain alleged.”  Id.  This decision was made in light of
McDaniels’s daily activities, the medicine she took, and the treatment she received.  In
other words, the ALJ considered the very factors in Social Security Ruling 88-13 that
McDaniels claims he ignored.  See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529.
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that McDaniels’s pain was not
disabling.  Even in the immediate aftermath of her automobile accident, she never sought
7chiropractic treatment more than once a month.  She responded well to epidural steroid
injections and physical therapy, reporting significant improvements in her back and neck. 
See Record at 121, 150.  Percocet reduced her pain without serious side effects.  Despite
her testimony that she could sit for only 15 to 20 minutes at a time and could not walk
even half a block, her pain did not stop her from walking down the catwalk in a charity
fashion show.  In short, the record contains evidence that McDaniels suffered significant
pain, but it does not compel the finding that her pain, when properly treated, was
disabling.
III.
After careful consideration of McDaniels’s claims, we conclude that substantial
evidence supports the Commissioner’s finding that she was not disabled.  The decision of
the District Court, which reached the same conclusion, is affirmed.
